Disclosure of classified military information

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1. The starting proposition

Classified military information is treated as an asset of the United States, not as a component of a sale. The manual states the policy directly. Such information "is a national security asset that must be protected and shared with foreign governments only when there is a clearly defined benefit to the United States, when authorized by officials designated under the Directive and then only when all requirements of the Directive are met" (SAMM C3.2.1).

The directive is DoD Directive 5230.11, which implements National Disclosure Policy. The policy document itself is not public, but its architecture is described in the manual and is stable enough to plan against.

2. The rule against implying an answer

Before any of the machinery runs, there is a rule about what may be said. "U.S. policy is to avoid creating false impressions of USG readiness to make available classified military materiel, technology, or information" (SAMM C3.2.2).

The reason given is that hardware and knowledge are classified differently. Much military hardware is unclassified, while its operation, its maintenance and the related training may involve sensitive classified information (SAMM C3.2.2).

The consequence is a prior authorization requirement. Proposals that will lead to eventual disclosure of classified military information must be authorized in advance by designated disclosure officials in the originating department, or by the National Disclosure Policy Committee. The manual adds a line that surprises people: "This includes the release of unclassified Price and Availability (P&A) data" (SAMM C3.2.2).

And a required disclaimer. It must be "explicitly stated and acknowledged that no U.S. commitment to furnish such classified information or materiel is intended or implied until disclosure has been approved" (SAMM C3.2.2).

3. Who can actually say yes

The National Disclosure Policy Committee is the central authority for formulating, promulgating, administering and monitoring the policy. Above it sits a very short list. "The Secretary of Defense and the Deputy Secretary of Defense are the only officials who may grant unilateral exceptions to NDP-1", and in most cases exceptions are granted or denied by the committee itself (SAMM C3.2.3).

Below that, authority is delegated. Each military department and component appoints a principal disclosure authority at headquarters level and a designated disclosure authority at subordinate command level (SAMM C3.2.3).

The catch-all is worth memorizing. "Any commitment to disclosure or release of controlled defense-related information or technology must be authorized by the PDA or DDA unless authority is otherwise delegated in a Delegation of Disclosure Authority Letter (DDL)" (SAMM C3.2.3). The letter is the instrument that pushes a decision down to a program office, and its absence is often what a delay turns out to be.

4. What a positive decision requires

Decisions are made case by case, and an affirmative one needs more than one signature. It requires the consent of the authority representing the component that originated the information. It also requires the written consent of the official holding original classification authority, where the material has not already been marked for release to that recipient (SAMM C3.2.4).

The decision also depends on a government-to-government instrument being in place, normally a bilateral general security agreement covering mutual protection of classified information (SAMM C3.2.4). Authorizations are recorded in the National Disclosure Policy System.

One further approval is easy to overlook because it sits at the far end. "The chief of the U.S. diplomatic mission must approve in-country release of all security assistance (SA) information to a purchaser" (SAMM C3.2.4).

5. When there is no security agreement

Not every partner holds a general security agreement, and the manual provides for that. Where a co-production or cooperative development memorandum governs the work, the protection provisions can be carried in that memorandum (SAMM C3.2.6).

The offer document cannot do the job. The manual says so in five words: "LOAs, however, are not international agreements" (SAMM C3.2.6).

So a separate instrument is required. Where classified information supports a sale and no general agreement exists, "a program specific security agreement developed and approved by the Defense Technology Security Administration (DTSA) containing the security requirements must be concluded prior to discussion of CMI with the purchasing government" (SAMM C3.2.6). That agreement comes before the discussion, not before the delivery.

6. Where industry sits in this

Classified information released to contractors is governed by the National Industrial Security Program, which applies through the security agreement a facility signs and through the security requirements clause in the contract (SAMM C3.2.7). The detailed safeguarding requirements are in 32 CFR part 117.

A classified contract may be awarded to a foreign contractor where the information is releasable to that contractor's government under the policy. Before any activity that could disclose classified information, a facility security clearance assurance is sought from the security authorities of that country (SAMM C3.2.8).

Where a contract calls for delivery of classified material abroad, the implementing agency is responsible for delivery (SAMM C3.2.9). The mechanics of that movement are set out in transportation plans for classified and explosive cargo.

7. Meetings are disclosures too

Many disclosures happen in a room rather than in a document. The manual notes that they occur through visual demonstrations or verbal exchanges during meetings and visits, and it treats the approval accordingly: "Approval of a classified visit by a Designated Disclosure Authority (DDA) is a disclosure decision" (SAMM C3.4.1).

Most visits and assignments requiring access to classified material run through the Foreign Visit System. Visits are categorized as one-time, normally under 30 days, recurring, or extended beyond 30 days for a liaison officer, an exchange officer or cooperative program personnel (SAMM C3.4.1).

Placing a foreign liaison officer inside a cleared contractor facility carries its own step. The assignment has to be coordinated with and agreed by the contractor and the supporting security office, so that responsibility for security oversight is fixed, and the terms should be written into the supporting contract (SAMM C3.4.1.3).

Key terms

CMI	Classified military information, shared only where there is a clearly defined benefit to the United States. SAMM C3.2.1.
NDPC	National Disclosure Policy Committee, the central authority for the policy and for most exceptions to it.
PDA and DDA	Principal and designated disclosure authorities, who authorize release at component and command level.
DDL	Delegation of Disclosure Authority Letter, the instrument that delegates release authority further down.
GSA	General security agreement, the bilateral instrument on mutual protection of classified information.

Every statement above links to the document behind it. The full source list for this piece is on the sources page.

This page describes public United States government programs for general information. It is not legal, regulatory or procurement advice, and it does not address the facts of any particular case.

How Sentfore supports this

Cleared work and cleared people have to be housed, moved and protected wherever a program runs. Sentfore provides protective security, secure transport, accommodation and site support for defense programs in complex environments, and its principals have worked on overseas defense and security programs. Requirements can be sent through the contact page.