Screening missile technology and large drones

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1. A political regime with legal effect

The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) is a voluntary international arrangement. It controls the spread of rockets and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) able to deliver weapons of mass destruction, with related equipment and technology (SAMM C3.7.1). The Security Assistance Management Manual (SAMM) notes that it is a political commitment rather than a treaty. Many countries, the United States included, have passed laws restricting exports of the items it covers, and the American provisions sit in chapter 7 of the Arms Export Control Act. The wider release rules for sensitive systems are covered in anti-tamper and system release requirements.

The regime’s controls apply to every item on the United States Munitions List marked (MT) (SAMM C3.7.1.1). The State, Commerce and Defense Departments each regulate part of the export of such items. The Defense Department’s part is to identify the MT items that purchasers request through Foreign Military Sales (FMS). How the (MT) mark works on the list itself is covered in how the Munitions List is organized.

2. Screening every request

Technical reviews are standardized (SAMM C3.7.1.1). Reviewers must complete a missile technology proliferation course approved by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA). Each implementing agency (IA) keeps a roster of people trained in or familiar with the controls, updated and sent to DSCA every quarter.

The review happens early (SAMM C3.7.1.1.1). Once a Letter of Request (LOR) arrives, and before the Letter of Offer and Acceptance (LOA) is developed, the system program office or program manager reviews each offer for controlled items. The review covers items in the offer itself and items expected to form part of the associated program.

3. Explosives and fuses

Two kinds of item carry special reporting rules (SAMM C3.7.1.1.1). Compounds listed in item 4 of the regime annex must be reported if they are exported in bulk, or in any form that could help make missile or UAV propellant. They are not reported where they are molded or poured into a form that rules out use as rocket propellant, such as the charge in a shell, cartridge, squib or actuator.

Fuses follow a similar logic (SAMM C3.7.1.1.1). Every fuse technically meets the annex description of safing, arming, fusing and firing mechanisms. Even so, the reviewer does not report common munitions fuses. A fuse is reported only if it is of an unusual type not likely to be found in most foreign arsenals, or uses sophisticated means such as radar to set burst height.

4. The list and the State Department approval

The reviewer sends the list of controlled items to the IA’s regime point of contact as early as possible, to keep delays to a minimum (SAMM C3.7.1.1.2). For each item the list gives the case identifier, a general case description naming the major associated systems, and the Military Articles and Services List number. It also gives the annex category and item, the nomenclature, and a detailed description including the manufacturer.

The point of contact checks the list and sends an approval request to the State Department’s Office of Missile, Biological, and Chemical Nonproliferation, copied to DSCA as appropriate (SAMM C3.7.1.1.3). It makes sure DSCA gets a copy of State’s response. The IA also places the approval request in the electronic package uploaded to the Case Tracking System.

5. The top category of drones

The manual gives examples of category I surveillance and combat UAVs, noting the list is not complete (SAMM C3.7.2). They include the Predator, Reaper, Global Hawk and Triton, the Sky Warrior, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Alliance Ground Surveillance system. American policy sets a strong presumption against transferring these systems (SAMM C3.7.2.1).

The process therefore starts before any request is written (SAMM C3.7.2.1). If the Security Cooperation Organization (SCO) learns the host country is considering such a request, it should start a requirements analysis and prescreening. The first step is a Security Cooperation Organization Assessment that answers every element in the manual’s table. The SCO consults the IAs and their foreign disclosure office, the country team and the Combatant Command (CCMD). The CCMD comments on elements 1 to 17, and both documents go to the Joint Staff and DSCA. If the SCO cannot finish the assessment before the request arrives, the same information goes into the country team assessment.

The manual calls this a collaborative analysis of the partner’s military requirements (SAMM C3.7.2.1). The aim is to find the platform and payload combination that meets those requirements and complies with the regime and other American security requirements. The options run from a manned aircraft, through a category II UAV, to a category I system.

6. What the assessment asks

The assessment table has twenty numbered questions, which fall into a few groups (SAMM C3.7.2.1). The first group covers the mission: primary and secondary missions, desired range, payload, altitude and endurance, and how many aircraft are needed and why that number is the minimum. It asks for expected sorties and flight hours, basing, and whether operations need beyond line of sight links or encryption.

A second group weighs the wider effect (SAMM C3.7.2.1). It asks why neither a manned aircraft nor a lower category drone would meet the need, whether this is the first such capability in the region, and how neighbors would react. It covers the effect on the regional military balance and on American relations, the availability of comparable foreign systems, and the contribution to American strategic and foreign policy goals.

The rest tests whether the partner can handle the system (SAMM C3.7.2.1). It asks about the ability to account for, safeguard, operate and maintain it, including the maintenance concept and depot repair. It asks for an end use monitoring plan and the SCO’s plan for checking compliance. It covers training numbers and timing, any American presence in country, and membership of NATO, the regime and the main nonproliferation treaties.

Key terms

MTCR	A voluntary international arrangement controlling missiles and drones able to carry weapons of mass destruction.
(MT) annotation	The mark on Munitions List entries covered by the regime’s controls.
Regime point of contact	The implementing agency official who checks the list and seeks State approval.
Category I UAV	The top category of surveillance and combat drones, subject to a strong presumption against transfer.
SCO assessment	The embassy office’s twenty-element analysis before a request for a category I drone.

Every statement above links to the document behind it. The full source list for this piece is on the sources page.

This page describes public United States government programs for general information. It is not legal, regulatory or procurement advice, and it does not address the facts of any particular case.

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