Security duties in the embassy office

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1. Who is responsible for protecting the office

A security cooperation office sits inside an embassy but belongs to the defense department, which raises an awkward question about who protects it. The manual settles that by agreement rather than by rule.

For most missions a memorandum of agreement is in force between the chief of mission and the combatant commander. "The MOA delineates whether the COM or the CCDR has AT/FP responsibility for the various DoD personnel and dependents in country" (SAMM C2.1.9.1).

In practice one side usually takes it. "The implementing MOAs usually assign responsibility and authority for SCO security to the COM, rather than the CCDR" (SAMM C2.1.9.1). The office then coordinates with the defense attache, the embassy regional security officer and the protection staff at the combatant command (SAMM C2.1.9.1). Who it answers to generally is covered in the security cooperation organization.

2. Classified material, and a test for keeping any

The office carries a custody duty that does not depend on anyone else. "The SCO is responsible for safeguarding U.S. SC-related classified information located in foreign countries" (SAMM C2.1.9.2).

Holding material at all requires a reason. Apart from information already authorized for release to the host government and under that government’s control, "the retention of U.S. classified material is authorized only if it is necessary to satisfy USG mission requirements" (SAMM C2.1.9.2). The rule covers material brought in temporarily by couriers as well as anything kept permanently.

What may be released to a partner government at all is a separate question, covered in disclosure of classified military information.

3. Four ways to store it

Whether kept permanently or temporarily, "classified material must be stored under USG control" (SAMM C2.1.9.2.1), and the manual lists exactly four acceptable arrangements, in descending order of protection built into the building itself.

The first needs no extra measures: "At a U.S. military installation or a location where the United States enjoys rights of inviolability, such as an embassy or consulate" (SAMM C2.1.9.2.1.1).

The second is a building used only by American tenants, provided it is under 24 hour control by government personnel (SAMM C2.1.9.2.1.2). The third is a shared building, which adds a container requirement: "provided the classified material is stored in security containers approved by General Services Administration (GSA) and is under 24-hour control by USG personnel" (SAMM C2.1.9.2.1.3).

The fourth is the hardest case, a shared building under host government control, and it adds a room inside the room: "provided the classified material is stored in GSA-approved security containers that are further secured in a locked room or area to which only USG personnel have access" (SAMM C2.1.9.2.1.4).

4. Keeping releasable and non-releasable apart

Where host government staff and American staff share space, the two categories of material are separated. Material not authorized for release must, so far as possible, be segregated from releasable material to make physical control workable and prevent inadvertent compromise (SAMM C2.1.9.2.2).

Segregation buys a genuine relaxation. "U.S. classified material that is releasable to the host nation need not be subject to the 24-hour U.S. control requirement provided the host government exercises its own control measures over the pertinent areas or containers during non-duty hours" (SAMM C2.1.9.2.2).

Visits are handled the same way, by default escorted. "SCO personnel must escort foreign nationals in areas where non-releasable U.S. classified material is present" (SAMM C2.1.9.2.3). Operational necessity allows an exception during duty hours, where "foreign nationals may be permitted, during duty hours, unescorted entry to such areas provided the non-releasable information is properly stored or is under the direct personal supervision and control of cleared USG personnel" (SAMM C2.1.9.2.3).

5. Local staff and the narrow exception

Locally employed staff are central to how an embassy office actually functions, and they are barred from classified information unless a specific authorization is issued (SAMM C2.1.9.2.4).

The manual then closes the obvious loophole. "LAA will not be issued merely as a convenience or to avoid the requirement to control access by LE staff members to areas and information" (SAMM C2.1.9.2.4).

Three conditions have to hold together. "The LE staff member must demonstrate a unique skill or expertise in support of a lawful and authorized government function" (SAMM C2.1.9.2.4), must need the access to do the job, and there must be no cleared or clearable American citizen available (SAMM C2.1.9.2.4). Even then the access reaches only as far as what is releasable to that person’s own country, so the controls on non-releasable material still apply to them.

Vetting is periodic and local. "All LE staff are required to undergo five-year background investigations" (SAMM C2.1.9.2.4.1), and "The investigations are conducted by the Embassy RSO" (SAMM C2.1.9.2.4.1).

6. Clearance to enter the country

The office is also the gatekeeper for American military movement into the country. "SCOs process requests for foreign clearance (also known as country clearance) and coordinate security, logistical, and administrative support for official DoD visitors and aircraft" (SAMM C2.1.9.3).

Standing clearances can be negotiated for recurring activity such as exercises and contingencies (SAMM C2.1.9.3.1). The governing document is a published guide: "The SCO must understand and enforce compliance with the DoD Foreign Clearance Guide (FCG) and local embassy and CCMD policy on foreign clearance issues" (SAMM C2.1.9.3.1).

The office does not merely apply that guide, it maintains it. "SCOs are also responsible for ensuring the FCG is current for the country of assignment" (SAMM C2.1.9.3.2), including submitting changes such as added restrictions or longer lead times.

7. Everything else, and the limit on it

A long tail of other work lands on the same office. "The SCO performs other non-SA functions required by the CCDR and Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), such as exercise planning and coordination, port visits, coordination of bilateral meetings" (SAMM C2.1.7.4). Where such duties become continuous, the command is expected to review funding and staffing (SAMM C2.1.7.4).

Support to visiting personnel has a stated stopping point. "The SA-funded members of the SCO may provide standard administrative support for non-SA personnel assigned/attached/TDY to the SCO performing SC and DoD functions until such support detracts from the primary SA mission" (SAMM C2.1.7.4.1).

The sharpest limit concerns training. "SA-funded personnel may provide advisory and training assistance to the host nation military establishment" (SAMM C2.1.7.4.2), but "this assistance must be minimal and cannot interfere with the primary performance of SA management responsibilities" (SAMM C2.1.7.4.2), and then the flat prohibition: "Actual military training must not be performed" (SAMM C2.1.7.4.2). Delivering training is a job for a deployed team, as described in who a deployed team answers to.

8. What a supplier can take from this

The storage rules explain something suppliers meet as unexplained slowness. An office in a shared or host controlled building needs approved containers, and in the worst case a locked room around them, before classified material can sit there. That shapes where a briefing can happen and what can be left behind.

The local staff rule is the other one worth knowing. The person who answers the phone may have no access to the material under discussion, and cannot be given it for convenience. And foreign clearance for an American visitor or aircraft runs through this same office, which is worth allowing for when planning a technical visit.

Key terms

Rights of inviolability	The protected status of an embassy or consulate that makes it acceptable storage without further measures.
Segregation	Keeping releasable and non-releasable material physically apart, which relaxes the 24 hour control requirement for the releasable part.
Limited access authorization	The narrow permission allowing a locally employed staff member access, never granted as a convenience.
Foreign clearance	Country clearance for official visitors and aircraft, processed by the embassy office, which also keeps the guide current.

Every statement above links to the document behind it. The full source list for this piece is on the sources page.

This page describes public United States government programs for general information. It is not legal, regulatory or procurement advice, and it does not address the facts of any particular case.

How Sentfore supports this

Protecting people, material and information in a difficult environment is the whole of the problem at the delivery end. Sentfore provides secure movement, protective security, facilities and life support for defense programs in complex environments. Requirements can be sent through the contact page.